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Vulnerabilities of Massive MIMO Systems
Against Pilot Contamination Attacks
Berk Akgun, Marwan Krunz, and O. Ozan Koyluoglu
Abstract
We consider a single-cell massive MIMO system in which a base station (BS) with a large number
of antennas transmits simultaneously to several single-antenna users in the presence of an attacker.
The BS acquires the channel state information (CSI) based on uplink pilot transmissions. In this work,
we demonstrate the vulnerability of CSI estimation phase to malicious attacks. For that purpose, we
study two attack models. In the first model, the attacker aims at minimizing the sum-rate of downlink
transmissions by contaminating the uplink pilots. In the second model, the attacker exploits its in-band
full-duplex capabilities to generate jamming signals in both the CSI estimation and data transmission
phases. We study these attacks under two downlink power allocation strategies when the attacker knows
and does not know the locations of the BS and users. The formulated problems are solved using
stochastic optimization, Lagrangian minimization, and game-theoretic methods. A closed-form solution
for a special case of the problem is obtained. Furthermore, we analyze the achievable individual secrecy
rates under a pilot contamination attack, and provide an upper bound on these rates. Our results indicate
that the proposed attacks degrade the throughput of a massive MIMO system by more than 50%.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) is one of the key technologies in the upcoming
5G systems. It is envisioned that a cellular base station (BS) in 5G systems will be equipped
with a very large antenna array, e.g., hundreds of antennas or more, boosting the transmission
rate by orders of magnitude compared to conventional MIMO systems. Even though MIMO is a
well-studied concept in wireless communications, massive MIMO requires novel techniques to
overcome new design challenges, and as such it has received significant attention from researchers
over the last few years (see, for example, [1], [2], [3], and the references therein).
One of the important issues in massive MIMO systems is pilot contamination (PC) [4].
Because of the large number of antennas at the BS and the relatively short channel coherence
time, the channel state information (CSI) between the BS and various users must be estimated
frequently using uplink pilot transmissions. Assuming channel reciprocity, the BS utilizes these
CSI estimates for downlink data transmissions. However, due to the limited number of orthogonal
pilot sequences (e.g., in the order of tens [4]), users in neighboring cells may share the same
pilots. Interference among these pilots causes erroneous CSI estimates at the BS, leading to poor
system performance.
In [5] the authors studied an attack that exploits vulnerabilities of the channel training phase
in time division duplexing (TDD) systems. The key idea behind this attack is to contaminate
uplink pilot transmissions and cause an erroneous uplink channel estimation. Typically, if the
CSI is available, the BS would use MIMO beamforming techniques such as maximum-ratio
transmission (MRT) to maximize the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) at users. However, the benefits
of these techniques vanish rapidly if the CSI estimates are erroneous. A self-contamination
technique was proposed in [6] to detect this type of attack. The authors in [7] proposed another
approach in which the legitimate user transmits four random phase-shift keying symbols, and
the BS checks the correlation matrix of the received signals. Based on the ratio of two largest
eigenvalues of this matrix, the BS detects the attack. Secure transmissions for TDD-based massive
MIMO systems was studied in [8] in the presence of an active eavesdropper. The authors derived
the optimal power allocation for the information and artificial noise (AN) signals at the BS such
that secrecy is asymptotically guaranteed, i.e., as the number of BS antennas (M) tends to infinity.
In [9], the authors proposed providing secrecy against PC attacks by keeping pilot assignments
hidden and using a pilot set that scales with M . However, there are two main problems with this
scheme. First, it requires a longer pilot transmission phase, which increases the overhead and
decreases the throughput. Second, computationally intensive cryptographic methods are required
to keep pilot assignments hidden. All of the papers discussed above consider an attacker that
targets one user at a time. Even when a multiuser system is in place, the attacker randomly
selects a given user and contaminates its pilot sequence. Given that one of the key aspects of
massive MIMO systems is to serve tens of users simultaneously, the vulnerabilities of these
systems to a multiuser pilot contamination attack should be investigated.
In this paper, we consider a single-cell multiuser massive MIMO network in the presence of
an attacker. We study two attack models. In the first model, the attacker aims at minimizing
the sum-rate of downlink transmissions by contaminating uplink pilot transmissions. We derive
the downlink transmission rates with and without the PC attack by exploiting the channel
hardening effect (effect of small-scale fading on channel gains vanishes asM tends to infinity) in
massive MIMO. Optimal attack strategies are then investigated for two different cases: when the
attacker knows the locations of the BS and users and when she does not have this information.
Considering a fixed power allocation strategy for downlink data transmissions, convex problems
are formulated for the optimal PC attack. These problems are solved via the interior-point and
Lagrangian minimization methods. We obtain a closed-form solution for the case of perfect
information, i.e., known topology at the attacker. This solution represents a lower bound on
the downlink sum-rate of massive MIMO systems under an optimal PC attack and a fixed BS
transmission power. Then, we study the scenario where the BS optimizes its own power allocation
scheme in the presence of PC attacks. For this case, a game-theoretic problem formulation is
considered in which the BS and attacker are the players of the game. In particular, we obtain a
convex-concave game, and propose an iterative algorithm that converges to a Nash equilibrium
(NE) of the game. This analysis provides an upper bound on the downlink sum-rate of massive
MIMO systems under an optimal PC attack.
For the second attack model, the attacker generates jamming signals in both the pilot and
downlink data transmission phases. For this hybrid attack, the attacker is required to have a
full-duplex radio. Specifically, the attacker estimates the channels between users and itself while
jamming the uplink pilot transmissions. These estimates are then used to strengthen the attack
during the downlink data transmission phase. Stochastic optimization techniques are used to find
the optimal power allocation at the attacker so as to minimize the downlink sum-rate of the
system.
Massive MIMO systems are robust against passive eavesdropping, as the CSI at a legitimate
receiver and an eavesdropper are near-orthogonal [7]. However, these systems are vulnerable
to an active attacker that contaminates the uplink pilot transmissions. Therefore, we extend our
work in [10] and analyze the secrecy performance of a massive MIMO system under a PC
attack. Specifically, an attacker receives the information signals intended to users with a much
higher signal power by using the PC attack. We study a problem where the attacker minimizes
the maximum of the achievable individual secrecy rates at users. Our analysis provides an upper
bound on the achievable individual secrecy rates in a given massive MIMO system under the PC
attack. Moreover, by introducing chance constraints, we study the case where the attacker does
not know the locations of users. The formulated problems are numerically solved by an iterative
method. Numerical results show that the downlink sum-rate decreases significantly under a PC
attack. Particularly, when the attacker is close to the BS, the downlink sum-rate of all users is
reduced by more than 50%. Another important result of our work is that an attacker without
perfect information about user locations is almost as devastating as one with perfect information.
This fact emphasizes the vulnerability of massive MIMO systems to PC attacks. Further, we
observe that even if the attacker moves farther from the BS, the maximum per-user secrecy rate
is reduced by almost 30%.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. In Section
III, we compute the downlink transmission rates with/without a PC attack. Our PC attack under
a fixed and optimal BS transmission power is studied in Section IV. We analyze the secrecy
rates of the users in massive MIMO systems in Section V. Section VI investigates the hybrid
attack model. We provide numerical results in Section VII, and conclude the paper in Section
VIII.
Throughout the paper, we adopt the following notation. E[·] indicates the expectation of a
random variable. Row vectors and matrices are denoted by bold lower-case and upper-case
letters, respectively. (·)∗ and (·)T represent the complex conjugate transpose and transpose of
a vector or matrix, respectively. Frobenius norm and the absolute value of a real or complex
number are denoted by ‖ · ‖ and | · |, respectively. A ∈ CM×N means that A is an M × N
complex matrix, and IM is an M ×M identity matrix. CN (µ, σ2) denotes a complex circularly
symmetric Gaussian random variable of mean µ and variance σ2. [x]+ is defined as max(x, 0).
For simplicity, log2(·) is referred to as log(·).
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Fig. 1. Orthogonality of pilot sequences in space-time-frequency domain.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a single-cell massive MIMO system in which the BS (Alice) uses a large array
of M antenna elements to transmit/receive independent data streams to/from K single-antenna
users (Bobs), where M ≫ K. Because of the large M , the channel coherence time is not long
enough to estimate the CSI of all M downlink channels at each user [3]. Therefore, TDD is used
instead of FDD (in FDD, the downlink and uplink channels are estimated separately). In TDD,
Alice estimates the CSI for uplink channels after receiving pilot sequences transmitted by Bobs.
If these pilot symbols are not perfectly orthogonal to each other, interference among them causes
erroneous channel estimates at the BS. Assuming channel reciprocity, these estimates are used
in setting the precoding matrices of downlink data transmissions. There is no standardization for
massive MIMO systems regarding the orthogonality of the pilot sequences. However, the authors
in [4] suggested assigning an orthogonal time-frequency pilot sequence to each Bob. Orthogonal
space-time block codes can also be utilized, as in 802.11ac systems, to increase the number of
orthogonal pilot sequences. Fig. 1 shows an example of eight pilot sequences. Pilot sequences
p1 and p2 are orthogonal space-time coded sequences. They are sent in the same time interval
(t1) over the same frequency (f1) by two different Bobs. On the other hand, the orthogonality of
p1 and p5 is guaranteed by transmitting them in different time intervals t1 and t2, e.g., p1 = 0
during t2. Similarly, p1 and p3 are transmitted on different frequencies f1 and f2, respectively.
The received signal at Alice during the pilot transmission phase is given by:
YA =
K∑
i=1
√
Pkh
T
k pk +W (1)
where hTk ∈ CM×1 represents the uplink channel from Bobk (kth Bob) to Alice. The mth entry,
m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, of this vector is given by h(m)k =
√
θkg
(m)
k , where θk and g
(m)
k ∼ CN (0, 1)
represent the path-loss component (large-scale fading) and small-scale effects of the channel
(Rayleigh fading), respectively. Note that θk is the same for all antennas, so hk can be written as
hk =
√
θkgk, where gk is a vector of all g
(m)
k , m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}. pk ∈ C1×L is the transmitted
pilot sequence by Bobk, where L is the number of symbols in the pilot sequence. As these
pilot sequences are orthogonal to each other, pkp
∗
l = 0 ∀ k and l ∈ K, where k 6= l and
K = {1, · · · , K}. We assume pk is a unit vector (i.e., pkp∗k = 1 ∀k ∈ K). Pk is the pilot
transmission power at Bobk. W is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) matrix, whose
entries are zero-mean, unit-variance normal random variables.
Without loss of generality, consider the estimation of hi at Alice. Let hˆi represent this estimate.
Under a priori knowledge of pi, Alice post-multiplies the received signal by p
∗
i and divides it
by
√
Pi and L to obtain:
hˆTi =
YAp
∗
i√
PiL
=
K∑
k=1
√
Pkh
T
kpkp
∗
i√
PiL
+
Wp∗i√
PiL
= hTi + w˜
T
i (2)
where w˜Ti ,
Wp∗i√
PiL
∼ CN (0, 1
PiL
IM).
A. PC Attack Model
We now describe the first attack model considered in this paper. The attacker aims to contam-
inate pilot transmissions by imposing his signal. We assume that the attacker knows the pilot
sequences used by Bobs (generally, pilot sequences are publicly known). Because the number
of orthogonal pilots is limited, after eavesdropping on the channels for some time, the attacker
can learn the pilots assigned to various Bobs. Let xJ ∈ C1×L be the signal generated by the
attacker. After the attack, the received signal at Alice will be modified as follows:
YA =
K∑
k=1
√
Pkh
T
kpk + h
T
JxJ +W (3)
where hTJ ∈ CM×1 represents the channel vector from the attacker to Alice. In the literature, xJ
is often designed such that only a single user is targeted by the attacker [5], [9]. This user is
selected randomly without any optimization. More specifically, xJ is often set to
√
PJpk, where
PJ is the average jamming power. In contrast, in our model, we set xJ to:
xJ =
√
PJ
K∑
k=1
√
αkpk (4)
where αk is the ratio between the power that the attacker allocates to pilot pk and the average
jamming power. Note that
∑K
k=1 αk ≤ 1. The objective of the attacker is to minimize the
downlink sum-rate. Let Rk be the downlink transmission rate at Bobk. The attacker’s goal can
be formulated as follows:
minimize
{αk ∀k∈K}
∑
k∈K
Rk (5)
subject to αk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K and
∑K
k=1 αk ≤ 1.
III. DOWNLINK TRANSMISSION RATES
In this section, we analyze the downlink sum-rate in the underlying massive MIMO system
with/without the aforementioned PC attack.
A. No PC Attack Scenario
In massive MIMO systems, the BS often applies MRT precoder [1]–[3], [11]. For conventional
MIMO systems, MRT gives rise to inter-user interference. However, as M tends to infinity,
the channels between the BS and individual users become orthogonal to each other, and they
individually reduce to single-input single-output (SISO) channels. In this case, MRT is the
optimal precoder. Let sk be the downlink information signal intended to Bobk ∀k ∈ K, and
let vTk ∈ CM×1 be its normalized precoder, i.e., vkv∗k = 1. The received signal at Bobk in the
downlink data transmission phase is given by:
yk =
K∑
i=1
√
P
(d)
i hkv
T
i si + w
(d)
k (6)
where P
(d)
k and w
(d)
k are, respectively, the allocated power to sk at Alice and the AWGN with zero-
mean and unit-variance at Bobk. Employing MRT precoding, v
T
k is given by v
T
k = (hˆ
∗
k/‖hˆk‖).
The achievable downlink rate at Bobk becomes:
Rk = log
(
1 +
P
(d)
k |hkvTk |2∑
l∈{K\k} P
(d)
l |hkvTl |2 + 1
)
, k ∈ K. (7)
Note that the precoding vectors are computed based on channel estimates.
Next, we study the asymptotic behavior of Rk asM →∞. Such asymptotic analysis is needed
later on for comparison with the case under a PC attack. Consider the inter-user interference
term P
(d)
l |hkvTl |2 in (7). Scaling this term by M and taking the limit as M → ∞, we end up
with:
lim
M→∞
P
(d)
l |hkvTl |2
M
= 0 (8)
∀k and l ∈ K, where k 6= l (see Appendix A for the proof). The underlying intuition behind this
result is that entries of small-scale channel components of Bobk and Bobl are independent
random variables of zero-mean and unit-variance. Hence, limM→∞ glg∗k/M = 0. Similarly,
limM→∞ glw˜∗k/M = 0. This is a result of the channel orthogonality in massive MIMO systems.
On the other hand, for the term in the numerator in (7), we have
lim
M→∞
P
(d)
k |hkvTk |2
M
=
P
(d)
k θ
2
k
θk +
1
PkL
> 0 (9)
(see Appendix B for the proof). Hence, the downlink rate at Bobk behaves asymptotically as:
Rk ∼ log
(
1 +
P
(d)
k θ
2
k
(θk +
1
PkL
) 1
M
)
. (10)
In our paper, we consider a finite but sufficiently large M , with M ≫ K, so the channels are
near-orthogonal. As a result, the inter-user interference can be neglected as in (8). Moreover,
for a sufficiently large M , |hkvTk |2/M approaches the result in (9) ([3], [4], [11]). (In Section
VII, we numerically verify these results.) As explained before, θk is the large-scale channel
components at Bobk. Equation (10) indicates that the SINR does not depend on the small-scale
fading components, as they are averaged out by the large antenna array (channel hardening). The
term (1/M) in the equation comes from the AWGN w
(d)
k at Bobk. For example, as M → ∞,
the noise term vanishes and the SINR tends to infinity. Another noise term arises due to the
channel estimation error w˜i. For example, as the length of the pilots, L, increases, the second
term in the denominator becomes smaller. This leads to an increase in the downlink rate. The
same effect is also observed when the power allocated for pilots increases.
In this paper, we consider two different downlink transmit power allocation strategies at Alice:
“fixed” and “optimal”. Both strategies are subject to an average power constraint PA. Under
the fixed power allocation, P
(d)
k ∀k ∈ K is known to the attacker. For example, based on a
fairness criterion, these values may be determined before the pilot transmission phase (e.g.,
when Bobs are registered with the network), and Alice may convey this information to Bobs
through a feedback channel. If the attacker eavesdrops on this channel, she can obtain the power
allocation values. In an instance of this setup, Alice may simply allocate powers uniformly
to the information signals, i.e., P
(d)
1 = · · · = P (d)K = PA/K. On the other hand, under the
“optimal” power allocation strategy, Alice relies on the well-known water-filling technique to
assign powers, using (θk + (PkL)
−1)/(Mθ2k) as the water levels (see, e.g., [12]).
B. Presence of PC Attack
Under the attack model in (4), the following channel estimation is performed at Alice for each
Bobk:
hˆk = hk +
√
αkukhJ + w˜k (11)
where uk is the ratio between the average power at the attacker and the pilot transmission power
at Bobk, i.e., uk = PJ/Pk. In the rest of the paper, we assume that uk is known to the attacker.
Previously, we assumed that the attacker learns the pilot sequences by eavesdropping on the
uplink transmissions. The attacker can similarly learn the pilot transmission power. Also note
that these transmission powers are fixed in the current cellular systems. Alice is not aware of
the presence of the attacker, so she treats hˆk as the correct channel estimate. Employing MRT
precoding based on this estimation, Alice computes the precoder vector of sk as:
vTk =
(hk +
√
αkukhJ + w˜k)
∗
‖hk +√αkukhJ + w˜k‖ . (12)
Substituting this precoder vector in (7), the attacker’s optimization problem in (5) becomes
non-convex. To obtain a tractable attack model, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of Rk as
M → ∞. Following the same steps as in the case of no attacker, the following expression can
be obtained as M →∞:
Rk = log
(
1 +
P
(d)
k Mθ
2
k
θk + αkukθJ +
1
PkL
)
. (13)
As M increases, the massive MIMO system becomes more resilient to PC attacks. However, the
vulnerability of the system against such an attack can be observed in (13), which shows that the
SINR decreases with an increase in the jamming power αkuk, with the functional form as given
therein.
As in the previous section, a fixed or “optimal” power allocation strategy can be employed to
calculate each P
(d)
k . Fixed power allocation is performed exactly as before, whereas “optimal”
power allocation corresponds to the following strategy. Let φk , θk+αkukθJ+
1
PkL
. Then, Alice
tries to maximize Rsum =
∑K
k=1Rk to obtain the “optimal” power allocation vector:[
P
(d)
1 · · ·P (d)K
]
= argmax
xk,∀k∈K
K∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
xkMθ
2
k
φk
)
(14)
subject to
∑K
k=1 P
(d)
k ≤ PA and P (d)k ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K. Because Alice is unaware of the attack, she
will not necessarily solve the above problem. However, our goal is to observe the effect of PC
attack, even if Alice employs the least favorable power allocation scheme from the perspective
of the attacker. This way, we can establish an upper-bound on the downlink sum-rate under a
PC attack.
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL PC ATTACK
A. Fixed Power Allocation at Alice
In this section, we study the optimal PC attack strategy. Our analysis provides a lower bound
on the downlink sum-rate under a PC attack for a given power allocation at Alice. We incorporate
(13) into problem (5), considering fixed power allocation for the information signals at Alice:
P1 : minimize
{αk , ∀k∈K}
K∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
P
(d)
k Mθ
2
k
θk + αkukθJ +
1
PkL
)
s.t. αk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K,
K∑
k=1
αk ≤ 1.
For a given k ∈ K, we assume that θk = Az−γk , where A is a constant that depends on the
operating frequency, transmit and receive antennas, while γ and zk are the path-loss exponent
and the distance between Alice and Bobk, respectively. Similarly, zJ is the distance between
Alice and the attacker. For simplicity, the antennas at Bobs and the attacker are assumed to be
identical, so the same A is considered for all of them. As a result, the objective function of P1
is converted to the following one:
Rsum =
K∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
P
(d)
k MAz
−2γ
k
αkukz
−γ
J + z
−γ
k +
1
APkL
)
(15)
Next, we discuss two different scenarios based on the information available to the attacker.
1) Perfect Information: Here, we assume that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the
distances between Alice and individual Bobs as well as her own distance to Alice. Indeed, this
is an idealized scenario (from the attacker’s point of view), and is merely studied to provide a
benchmark for comparison with the case of uncertainty in distances. P1 is a convex programming
problem, and we obtain the optimal solution as follows.
Theorem 1: P1 has the following closed-form solution:
αk =
[√
Ak(Ak + 4/λ)−Ak − 2Bk
2
]+
∀k ∈ K (16)
where
Ak ,
P
(d)
k MAz
γ
J
ukz
2γ
k
and Bk ,
zγJ
ukz
γ
k
+
zγJ
ukAPkL
.
λ is the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) multiplier and is chosen such that
∑K
k=1 αk = 1. It can be
easily computed by the bisection method as
∑K
k=1 αk is a decreasing function of it.
Proof: See Appendix C.
2) Uncertainty in Distances: Suppose that the attacker does not have perfect knowledge about
various distances. Let Zk and ZJ be random variables (rvs) that correspond to the Alice-Bobk
and Alice-attacker distances, respectively. In this case, the expected value of Rsum is given by:
E[ Rsum ] =E
[
K∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
P
(d)
k MAZ
−2γ
k
αkukZ
−γ
J + Z
−γ
k +
1
APkL
) ]
=
K∑
k=1
E
[
log
(
1 +
P
(d)
k MAZ
−2γ
αkukZ
−γ
J + Z
−γ + 1
APkL
) ]
(17)
where Z is a generic rv that has the same distribution as Zk for all k. In (17), the expectation is
taken over Z and ZJ . The last equality follows from the assumption that the distributions of the
distances between individual Bobs and Alice are identical. We further assume that Bobs and the
attacker are randomly and uniformly located in a circular ring around Alice. Let Dmin and Dmax
be the minimum and maximum possible distances between Alice and any Bob, respectively.
Hence, the CDF of Z is given by Pr[Z ≤ x] = (x2 − D2min)/(D2max − D2min) where x ∈
[Dmin, Dmax]. Accordingly, the PDF of Z is given by fZ(x) = 2x/(D
2
max − D2min), for x ∈
[Dmin, Dmax].
Let Φk , αkukZ
−γ
J + Z
−γ + 1
APkL
. Under fixed downlink power allocation, the optimal PC
attack can be formulated by the following stochastic programming problem:
P2 : minimize
{αk ∀k∈K}
K∑
k=1
E
[
log
(
1 +
P
(d)
k MAZ
−2γ
Φk
) ]
s.t. αk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K,
K∑
k=1
αk ≤ 1.
The objective function in P2 can be rewritten as:
K∑
k=1
∫ Dmax
Dmin
∫ Dmax
Dmin
4xy
(D2max −D2min)2
log(Ψ(x, y)) dx dy (18)
where
Ψ(x, y) , 1 +
P
(d)
k MAx
−2γ
αkuky−γ + x−γ + 1APkL
for x, y ∈ [Dmin, Dmax]. This is a convex programming problem, as the objective function and
inequality constraints are all convex functions. The integral in (18) can be approximated by
Simpson’s Rule for double integrals, and can be solved efficiently by applying the interior point
method. Note that P2 need only be solved offline, so the time complexity of this solution method
is not a concern. We also note that although we only study a uniform distribution for the locations
of Bobs and the attacker, any arbitrary distribution can be considered. The integral operation
preserves the convexity, so the same steps can be followed to solve P2. Our numerical results
(not shown for brevity) indicate that for typical values of PA, A, K, and Dmax, the attacker
should target all Bobs by equally allocating its average power to various pilot sequences under
uniform power allocation when uk = ul ∀k, l ∈ K. That is, αk = PJ/K ∀k ∈ K. This is due to
the symmetry of Bobs for this special case, as will be discussed in Section VII.
3) Discussion: Let z , [z1, · · · , zK ] be the vector of distances from Alice to various Bobs
(known to the attacker). Let α∗(z, zJ) , [α∗1(z, zJ), · · · , α∗K(z, zJ)] and α∗ , [α∗1, · · · , α∗K ]
be the optimal solutions to P1 and P2, respectively. In this case, the objective function of P2
becomes EZ,ZJ [Rsum(α
∗)], and EZ,ZJ [Rsum(α
∗(Z, ZJ))] becomes the expectation of the optimal
solution of P1 under perfect information, where Z is the vector of i.i.d. distances Z1, · · · , ZK .
The expectations are taken over the random distances, as previously explained. The expected
value of perfect information (EVPI) is defined as follows:
EVPI , EZ,ZJ [Rsum(α
∗)]− EZ,ZJ [Rsum(α∗(Z, ZJ))]. (19)
Note that EVPI is always greater than or equal to zero, as the case with perfect information out-
performs the one with uncertainty. If EVPI is small, the attacker does not gain much by knowing
the exact distances. It can perform attacks almost as powerful as when perfect information is
available. On the other hand, if EVPI is high, the attacker may try to acquire distance information
by estimating Bobs’ locations relative to its own. For example, a group of colluding adversaries
can employ localization techniques (e.g., RSSI and time-of-arrival) to estimate Alice-to-Bobs
distances [13], [14]. This requires more complex and costly systems at the attacker. In Section
VII, we study the behavior of EVPI.
B. Optimal Power Allocation
In this section, we derive the optimal PC attack strategy when Alice adopts optimal (the
least favorable from the perspective of the attacker) power allocation strategy for downlink data
transmissions. Note that Alice is assumed to be unaware of the attack. Therefore, she cannot
customize her power allocation strategy to combat such an attacker. However, while the attacker
tries to minimize the downlink sum-rate, Alice tries to maximize this rate, without knowing
about the attack. This is a min-max problem, and its solution is found as follows. As seen from
(15), Rsum is a function of P
(d) ,
[
P
(d)
1 · · ·P (d)K
]
and α , [α1, · · · , αK ]. Thus, the problem can
be formulated as a convex-concave game; for a fixed P(d), Rsum(P
(d),α) is a convex function of
α, and for a fixed α, Rsum(P
(d),α) is a concave function of P(d). This means that the attacker
needs to solve the following game:
P3 : minimize
{α}
{
maximize
{P(d)}
Rsum(P
(d),α)
}
s.t. αk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K,
K∑
k=1
αk ≤ 1
P
(d)
k ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K,
K∑
k=1
P
(d)
k ≤ PA
Let an optimal solution of this game, or a saddle point, be (P(d)∗,α∗). That is (for any possible
power allocation P(d)),
Rsum(P
(d),α∗) ≤ Rsum(P(d)∗,α∗) ≤ Rsum(P(d)∗,α).
This relationship shows that an upper-bound on Rsum(P
(d),α) is obtained by solving P3. For
instance, when α = α∗, P(d)∗ maximizes Rsum(P(d),α∗). This optimal solution is obtained by
a well-known water-filling technique. Specifically,
P
(d)∗
k =
[
η − α
∗
kukz
−γ
J + z
−γ
k +
1
APkL
MAz−2γk
]+
(20)
where η is a water-filling level chosen such that
∑K
k=1 P
(d)
k = PA. η can be computed by bisection
method as this summation is an increasing function of it. Similarly, when P(d) = P(d)∗, α∗
minimizes Rsum(P
(d)∗,α). The optimal solution of this problem was previously given in Theorem
1. We propose to solve this game by using an iterative Gauss-Seidel method. To do that, we first
solve Rsum(P
(d),α) for some initial values of αk, e.g., αk = 0 ∀k ∈ K (initially, there is no PC
attack). Then, the obtained P
(d)
k values are used in Rsum(P
(d)∗,α), and this problem is solved
with respect to αk ∀k ∈ K as explained in Theorem 1. After this step, the second iteration starts
by solving Rsum(P
(d),α∗) using the new values of αk’s. As the number of iterations increases,
a better approximation for the saddle point is obtained. We evaluate the number of iterations
required to reach the Nash equilibrium of this game, and observe that the algorithm almost
always converges after 10 iterations.
Theorem 2: Gauss-Seidel iterations converge when used to solve P3.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Note that the above analysis applies to the case of perfect information where distances are known
to the attacker. It can be easily extended to the case where only the probability distribution of
distances is known. The same steps in Section IV-A2 are applied to account for the uncertainty.
In particular, the expectation of Rsum(P
(d),α) over ZJ and Zk’s is considered in the objective
function of P3. The resulting problem is still a convex-concave game that can be solved by the
Gauss-Seidel method. We skip this analysis here due to space limitations.
V. SECRECY ANALYSIS UNDER PC ATTACK
As we analyzed in the previous sections, channels between Bobs and Alice are near-orthogonal
in massive MIMO systems as long as M ≫ K. Indeed, as M → ∞, inter-user interference
vanishes in massive MIMO systems. The same reason also makes massive MIMO systems
well-protected against passive eavesdroppers (Eve). For example, channels of Eve and Bobs are
near-orthogonal as well, so the mutual information leakage at Eve is negligible. However, we
showed the vulnerability of massive MIMO systems against an active attacker that contaminates
the pilot transmissions. So far, we only considered the case where the attacker’s objective is
to minimize the downlink sum-rate. PC attack also makes Alice transmit information signals
towards the attacker, as the precoding vectors are designed based on the erroneous channel
estimates, which are linear combinations of CSI at Bobs as well as at the attacker. Therefore,
the attacker receives the information signals intended to Bobs in the data transmission phase.
As a secrecy metric, we consider the individual secrecy rates of Bobs, which ensure that
information leakage to an eavesdropper from each information message vanishes [15], [16].
Specifically, we study a problem in which the attacker, Eve, aims at minimizing the maximum of
the achievable individual secrecy rates at Bobs by leveraging PC attacks. Given MRT precoding
at Alice and the same attack model detailed in Sections II and III, the received signal at the
attacker in the downlink data transmission phase is given by:
yeve =
K∑
i=1
√
P
(d)
i hJv
T
i si + wJ (21)
where wJ is the AWGN at Eve, and v
T
k = (hk+
√
αkukhJ + w˜k)
∗/‖hk+√αkukhJ + w˜k‖. The
individual information leakage rate of sk is given by:
Rek = log
(
1 +
P
(d)
k |hJvTk |2∑
l∈{K\k} P
(d)
l |hJvTl |2 + 1
)
, ∀k ∈ K (22)
Note that Rek is obtained from the mutual information between sk and yeve where the all other
information signals are interpreted as noise. Similar to the previous sections, we analyze the
asymptotic behavior of Rek as M → ∞. As a result of this analysis, the following limit is
obtained:
lim
M→∞
P
(d)
k |hJvTk |2
M
=
P
(d)
k αkukθ
2
J
θk + αkukθJ +
1
PkL
(23)
(see Appendix E for the derivation of (23)). Therefore:
lim
M→∞
Rek = log


1 +
P
(d)
k αkukθ
2
J
θk + αkukθJ +
1
PkL∑
l∈{K\k}
P
(d)
l αlulθ
2
J
θl + αlulθJ +
1
PlL


. (24)
Note that limM→∞Rek is independent of M . As we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the
system, limM→∞Rek is referred to as R
e
k in the rest of the paper.
A. Known Distances at Attacker
The achievable individual secrecy rate for Bobk is defined by [Rk − Rek]+ [16]. Under the
fixed power allocation for the downlink signals at Alice and perfect information at the attacker,
the optimal PC attack to minimize the maximum of individual secrecy rates is formulated as
follows:
minimize
{αk, ∀k∈K}
max{R1 − Re1, · · · , RK − ReK , 0}
s.t. αk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K,
K∑
k=1
αk ≤ 1
We reformulate this problem by introducing a new decision variable ν, such that ν ≥ max{R1−
Re1, · · · , RK − ReK , 0}. This is equivalent to ν ≥ 0 and ν ≥ Rk − Rek ∀k ∈ K. The problem is
now converted to the following one:
P4 : minimize
{ν,αk , ∀k∈K}
ν
s.t. Rk − Rek − ν ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ K
ν ≥ 0, αk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K,
K∑
k=1
αk ≤ 1
Note that the solution of P4 provides the tightest upper bound on the achievable individual
secrecy rate that can be achieved by any Bob in a given massive MIMO system under an
optimal PC attack. However, due to the interference of the information signals at Eve, the first
constraint function in P4 is not convex. This makes the problem intractable. Let Gk , P
(d)
k θJ .
Therefore, Rk and R
e
k are given as follows:
Rk = log
(
1 +
Ak
αk +Bk
)
, (25)
Rek = log

1 +
Gkαk
αk +Bk∑K
l 6=k
Glαl
αl +Bl

 . (26)
Let Uk be an upper bound on Rk − Rek such that:
Uk , Rk − log
(
1 +
Gkαk
(αk +Bk)Ik
)
(27)
where Ik , (
∑K
l 6=kGl/Bl). Note that the function Rk−Rek is a monotonically increasing function
with respect to αl ∀l ∈ K, l 6= k. An upper bound of this function is obtained when αl = 1
∀l ∈ K, l 6= k. Replacing the first constraint in P4 by Uk − ν ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ K makes the problem
tractable, and its solution still provides an upper bound on the achievable individual secrecy rate
for any Bob. Furthermore, the logarithm function can be removed by defining νˆ , 2ν . Then, P4
becomes:
P5 : minimize
{νˆ,αk , ∀k∈K}
νˆ
s.t.
Ik(αk + Ak +Bk)
αk(Ik +Gk) +BkIk
− νˆ ≤ 0 ∀k ∈ K
νˆ ≥ 1, αk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K,
K∑
k=1
αk ≤ 1
Let fk(αk) denote Ik(αk + Ak + Bk)/(αk(Ik + Gk) + BkIk). Then, fk(αk) is a monotonically
decreasing function with respect to αk. Thus, we propose the following iterative method to
numerically solve P5. Initially, max{f1(α1), · · · , fK(αK)} is found where αk = 0 ∀k ∈ K.
WLOG, consider that fi(αi) is the maximum. Then, αi ← αi+δ where δ is a positive real number.
After that, the same process is repeated with the new values of αk’s as long as
∑K
k=1 αk ≤ 1
and νˆ ≥ 1. In Section VII, we numerically compare two upper bounds that are obtained by P4
and P5.
B. Unknown Distances at Attacker
If the location information of Bobs is not available at the attacker, she cannot guarantee any
upper bound on the individual secrecy rates. Therefore, in this case, we replace the first constraint
of P4 by a chance constraint, as follows:
Pr{Rk −Rek ≥ ν} ≤ ǫ ∀k ∈ K (28)
where ǫ ∈ [0, 1] is a given parameter. Note that the randomness in (28) comes from the distances
between Bobs and Alice, Zk ∀k ∈ K. (We assume that the attacker knows her distance to Alice,
which is a stationary massive MIMO BS.) This constraint guarantees that the probability of
achieving an individual secrecy rate that is higher than or equal to ν is less than or equal to ǫ at
Bobs. That is, only ǫ fraction of Bobs can achieve an individual secrecy rate above ν. As (28)
does not have a closed-form expression, P4 is intractable for this case as well. Therefore, we
use a similar bounding method as in the known distances case to make the problem tractable.
Let Uˆk be an upper bound on Rk − Rek such that:
Uˆk , Rk − log
(
1 +
Gkαk
(αk +Bk)Iˆk
)
(29)
where
Iˆk ,
K∑
l 6=k
P
(d)
l Aulz
−2γ
J
ulz
−γ
J +D
−γ
max +
1
APlL
. (30)
Note that the function Rk − Rek is a monotonically increasing function with respect to both αl
and zl ∀l ∈ K, l 6= k. An upper bound of this function is obtained when αl = 1 and zl = Dmax
∀l ∈ K, l 6= k. Thus, the following inequalities are obtained:
Pr{Rk −Rek ≥ ν} ≤ Pr{Uˆk ≥ ν} (31)
= Pr{P (d)k MAIˆkZ−2γk − (νˆ − 1)IˆkZ−γk ≥
νˆP
(d)
k αkukAz
−2γ
J + (νˆ − 1)Ik(αkukz−γJ + (APkL)−1)} (32)
≤ Pr{P (d)k MAIˆkZ−2γk − (νˆ − 1)IˆkZ−2γk ≥
νˆP
(d)
k αkukAz
−2γ
J + (νˆ − 1)Ik(αkukz−γJ + (APkL)−1)} (33)
= Pr

Zk ≤ 2γ
√
P
(d)
k MAIˆk − (νˆ − 1)Iˆk
Jk

 (34)
where Jk , νˆP
(d)
k αkukAz
−2γ
J +(νˆ−1)Ik(αkukz−γJ +(APkL)−1). To analyze the chance constraint,
we exploit (34), which is the CDF of Zk. As we stated before, Pr[Zk ≤ x] = (x2−D2min)/(D2max−
D2min) where x ∈ [Dmin, Dmax]. Hence, the chance constraint (28) is converted to:
P
(d)
k MAIˆk − (νˆ − 1)Iˆk
Jk
≤ (ǫ(D2max −D2min) +D2min)γ (35)
∀k ∈ K. This is equivalent to:
Iˆk(P
(d)
k MA + 1 +Q(αkukz
−γ
J + (APkL)
−1))
Iˆk +Q(P
(d)
k αkukAz
−2γ
J + Iˆk(αkukz
−γ
J + (APkL)
−1))
≤ νˆ (36)
∀k ∈ K where Q = (ǫ(D2max −D2min) +D2min)γ . To find the minimum νˆ for a given ǫ, the same
problem as P5 is considered at the attacker after replacing the first constraint by (36). Note
that the constraint function in (36) is a monotonically decreasing function with respect to αk.
Therefore, the method that we propose for solving P5 in the previous subsection can be used
here as well.
In this paper, we study the problem of minimizing the maximum of individual secrecy rates.
The problem in which the attacker aims at minimizing the sum of the individual secrecy rates
could be also solved by following similar steps. Particularly, the problem would be similarly
reformulated, and the new problem would be a convex optimization problem as well. Due to
space limitations, we omit the results here.
VI. HYBRID FULL-DUPLEX ATTACK
So far, we have considered jamming the pilot transmission phase. However, if the attacker is
equipped with a full-duplex (FD) radio that allows it to transmit and receive signals simultane-
ously over the same frequency, a more sophisticated attack can be launched. Further, a stronger
attack can also be launched with a multi-antenna (MIMO) FD-based attacker. In particular,
consider an attacker with an average power constraint over the whole transmission phase (pilot
Attacker
Bobs
Alice
(a)
Attacker
Bobs
Alice
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) Attacker contaminates the CSI estimation at Alice while overhearing the pilots from Bobs, (b) attacker generates
the jamming signals to reduce the signal strength at Bobs during data transmission.
and downlink data phases). Using an FD radio, the attacker can generate jamming signals during
both phases. For instance, the attacker may contaminate the CSI estimation process at Alice,
as in Fig. 2(a), without knowing the channels between itself and Bobs. At the same time, the
attacker can overhear the pilots (dashed lines in Fig. 2(a)) from Bobs using the FD radio, and
exploit this knowledge to transmit jamming signals during the downlink transmission phase,
as shown in Fig. 2(b). We call this attack a hybrid attack, as it combines the PC attack and
conventional data-jamming attack. Notice that even though the hybrid attack performs at least as
good as the PC attack, it requires an additional hardware capability (FD radio) at the attacker.
Even though the attacker needs one antenna to generate a jamming signal in data transmission
phase, we study a more general scenario where she is equipped with N + 1 antennas, where
N > 0. Our goal is to find an optimal strategy for the attacker to minimize the downlink sum-
rate, exploiting its multiple antennas. One of these antennas is reserved for the PC attack, while
the others receive the pilot signals from Bobs. The attacker estimates hJk ∈ C1×N , the channel
between Bobk and herself, during the pilot transmission phase. The self-interference signal at
the receiving antennas of the attacker is canceled by employing FD radio design techniques in
[17], [18]. For example, the self-interference channel is obtained by transmitting a pilot from the
antenna that jams the pilot signal. Then, the self-interference signal is extracted from the received
signals using this information. Let ni be the ith jamming signal in the downlink transmission
phase, i ∈ N = {1, · · · , N}. Let h(i)Jk = g(i)Jk
√
Az−γJk , i ∈ N and k ∈ K, be the channel gain
between the ith antenna of the attacker and Bobk, where zJk denotes the distance between the
attacker and Bobk and g
(i)
Jk is the small-scale fading. βi ∀i ∈ N denotes the ratio between the
allocated power for ni and PJ . By using the same PC attack model in Section II-A and MRT
precoding at Alice, the received signal at Bobk during the downlink data transmission phase is
given by:
yk =
K∑
i=1
√
P
(d)
i hk
hˆ∗i
‖hˆi‖
si +
N∑
i=1
√
βiPJh
(i)
Jkni + w
(d)
k . (37)
Adding the jamming term to (10), the following downlink sum-rate is obtained:
Rsum =
K∑
k=1
log

1 + Ck
Dk
(∑N
i=1 βiPJ |g(i)Jk|2Az−eJk + 1
)

 (38)
where
Ck , P
(d)
k MAz
−2γ
k and Dk , αkukz
−γ
J + z
−γ
k +
1
APkL
.
In this section, we do not analyze the secrecy, and focus on the attack that is studied in Section
IV. Given the setup above, we formulate a two-stage stochastic optimization problem to find the
optimal attacking strategy that minimizes the downlink sum-rate at Bobs. This problem can be
solved for various scenarios (e.g., perfect information, uncertainity in the distances and channels,
etc.) by utilizing the techniques in Section IV and the ones presented in this section. The solutions
of these problems are discussed in Section VII. For now, we explain our solution approach for
one of these scenarios. Specifically, we assume that the distances, powers of information signals,
and other constants in (38) are known to the attacker. In the first stage of the problem, the attacker
finds the optimal values of αk ∀k ∈ K without knowing any g(i)Jk ∀k ∈ K and ∀i ∈ N . In the
second stage (after learning g
(i)
Jk ∀k ∈ K and ∀i ∈ N during the pilot transmission phase),
the attacker optimally allocates the remaining power to the N jamming signals in the data
transmission phase, i.e., βi ∀i ∈ N . Let ω represent a certain realization of the channel, g(i)Jk,
and let Ω be the set of all realizations. (Note that g
(i)
Jk and βi are functions of these realizations.)
Let tp and td be the duration of pilot and data transmission phases, respectively. The two-stage
stochastic problem can be formulated as follows:
P6 : minimize
{αk ∀k∈K}
{βi(ω) ∀i∈N , ∀ω∈Ω}
Eω
[
K∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
Ck
Dk (Ek + 1)
)]
s.t. αk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K
βi(ω) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N , ∀ω ∈ Ω
Fk
tp + td
≤ 1 ∀ω ∈ Ω
where Fk , tp
∑K
k=1 αk+td
∑N
i=1 βi(ω) and Ek ,
∑N
i=1 βi(ω)|g(i)Jk(ω)|2PJAz−eJk . Note that g(i)Jk is
a continuous random variable. P6 can be approximately solved by creating T realizations, e.g.,
Ω has a cardinality of T . In particular, we replace the expectation in P6 by the sum of these
equiprobable T realizations. Therefore, we end up with K first-stage decision variables, namely
αk ∀k ∈ K, and NT second-stage decision variables, namely βi(ω) ∀i ∈ N and ∀ω ∈ Ω. The
underlying problem is a convex programming problem, and can be solved by the interior point
method. When T is large (for better approximation), the complexity of solving the problem
increases. However, as the problem is solved offline, the time complexity is not a concern.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We model the channel gain from each transmit antenna to each receive antenna as h =
g
√
Ad−3.522, where g ∼ CN (0, 1) and A = 3.0682× 10−5. The path-loss is modeled using the
COST-Hata Model with center frequency is 2 GHz [19]. The average transmit powers at Alice,
Bobk, and the attacker are 46, 20, and 30 dBm, respectively. The durations of the pilot and data
transmission phases are set to be equal [4]. We consider a 20 MHz channel with noise floor
of −101 dBm. Bobs and the attacker are uniformly and randomly distributed within a circular
ring whose center is Alice and whose outer radius is Dmax and Dmax,J, respectively. We set
Dmax to 750 meters and Dmin to 10 meters. Our results are averaged over 10
5 different network
realizations.
We set the number of users K = 10. In Fig. 3(a), we consider uniform power allocation
for both the information signals at Alice and the jamming signals at the attacker. The figure
depicts the downlink sum-rate vs. M . It shows that (10) and (13) are good approximations for
the downlink rates in (7). Note that the approximation-based sum-rate is slightly higher than
the exact values, as the inter-user interference does not perfectly vanish at a finite M . In our
subsequent results, we set M to 1000.
We observe the effect of the maximum distance between Alice and the attacker (Dmax,J) in
Figs. 3(b) and 3(c). In the case of a single-user PC attack, only one randomly selected Bob is
targeted by the attacker. This attack can also be interpreted as an unintentional interference from
a user in an adjacent cell. It does not have a big impact on the sum-rate. PC with uncertainty
(PC-unc) and PC with perfect information (PC-pi) were explained in Section IV-A, and optimal
PC-pi was studied in Section IV-B. Note that optimal PC-pi gives an upper-bound on the sum-
rate of a massive MIMO system under an optimal PC attack. As the attacker moves farther
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Fig. 3. (a) Downlink sum-rate vs. M under uniform power allocation at both Alice and the attacker, (b) downlink sum-rate
vs. Dmax,J, (c) Jain’s fairness index vs. Dmax,J, (d) downlink sum-rate vs. number of pilot symbols, (e) downlink sum-rate vs.
number of antennas at the attacker, (f) maximum of individual secrecy rates vs. Dmax,J, (g) CDF vs. downlink transmission
rate, (h) CDF vs. individual secrecy rate, (i) maximum of individual secrecy rates vs. ǫ.
from Alice, the sum-rate increases in all attack schemes. In Fig. 3(b), EVPI is around 20 Mbps.
This says that when the attacker knows the distribution of Bobs, it can launch attacks that are
almost as powerful as when the attacker has complete CSI. We also observe that the downlink
sum-rate without an attack (no PC attack case) is less than the one with the optimal PC-pi
if Dmax,J is higher than 700 meters. The reason is that Alice uniformly allocates downlink
transmission powers in no PC attack scheme, whereas she employs optimal power allocation
in the optimal PC-pi. In Fig. 3(c), we depict Jain’s fairness index for different schemes. Jain’s
fairness index ranges from 1/K to 1 for the worst and best cases, respectively (if all users have
the same downlink rate, the fairness index is 1). The figure shows that fairness among Bobs
is significantly reduced when PC attacks take place. PC-unc decreases the fairness more than
PC-pi. The reason behind this phenomena is that when the attacker is close to Alice and knows
the distances, Bobs with higher downlink rates are targeted. Therefore, Bobs are forced to have
closer downlink rates, which increases the fairness index. Note that even though PC-pi makes
the fairness higher compared to PC-unc, the sum-rate is lower in PC-pi.
In Fig 3(d), we set Dmax,J to 250 meters, and study the effect of the number of pilot symbols
L. As L increases, the sum-rate increases as well in no PC, single-user PC, and optimal PC-pi
attacks. The reason is that the error in MRT precoding vectors due to erroneous channel estimates
decreases, and the signal strength at Bobs increases. On the other hand, the sum-rate does not
increase under the PC-unc and PC-pi attacks. Note that in these cases, a fixed power is allocated
for the information signals at Alice, and she does not exploit the decrease in channel estimation
errors.
In Fig. 3(e), we compare hybrid and PC attacks under a similar average jamming power
constraint. We observe that the hybrid attacks outperform PC attacks with respect to the sum-
rate. Moreover, as the number of antennas at the attacker increases, the sum-rate slightly decreases
for the hybrid attack. Note that the hybrid attacks utilizes multiple antennas, whereas PC attacks
use a single-antenna. EVPI for the hybrid attacks is around 60 Mbps, which is much higher
than the one for PC attacks. The reason is that the hybrid attack includes one more source of
uncertainty due to the channels between Bobs and the attacker. Another important result is that
attacking only downlink data transmissions (no jamming during pilot transmission phase) does
not have as a great of an impact on performance as the impact of the PC attack.
We evaluate the effect of PC attack on individual secrecy rates in Fig. 3(f). Specifically, we
compare the schemes where there is no PC attack and PC attacks whose objective is to minimize
the maximum of the individual secrecy rates (PC-Sec). PC-Sec-P4 and PC-Sec-P5 denote the
results of the problems P4 and P5, respectively, with known distances. Note that even though
P4 is not a tractable problem, we obtain its results with a brute force method. For each scheme,
we show the results of both individual secrecy rates and transmission rates between Alice and
Bobs. It is observed that the massive MIMO systems are resilient to passive eavesdroppers, as
the maximum of transmission/secrecy rates are almost the same without a PC attack. On the
other hand, PC attack decreases the maximum of individual secrecy rates from nearly 110 Mbps
to 55 Mbps when Dmax,J is 325 meters. Moreover, we observe that when the attacker moves
farther from Alice, PC attack still reduces the maximum of individual secrecy rates by almost
30%. It is also noted that the solution of P5 is very close to the solution of P4, which provides
the tightest upper bound.
The empirical CDF of downlink transmission rate and individual secrecy rate under various
schemes are shown in Figs. 3(g) and 3(h), respectively. 90% of Bobs achieve a transmission rate
less than 40 Mbps under PC-pi. In the absence of a PC attack, nearly 33% of Bobs achieve a
transmission rate higher than 40 Mbps. In Fig. 3(h), we observe that 13% of Bobs have a zero
individual secrecy rate under PC-Sec, whereas only 7% fraction of Bobs have a zero individual
secrecy rate when there is no PC attack. Moreover, only 5% of Bobs have a secrecy rate above
75 Mbps.
In Fig. 3(i), we evaluate our secrecy analysis with unknown distances at the attacker. We
observe the effect of the designed parameter ǫ on the maximum of individual secrecy rates for
both cases where K = 10 and K = 20. Based on our analysis, 0.1 fraction of Bobs may achieve
an individual secrecy rate higher than 83 Mbps. When K = 10, the maximum of individual
secrecy rates is just below this threshold value on average. On the other hand, when K = 20,
this threshold value is exceeded almost always as expected. Note that when ǫ = 0.6, the attacker
guarantees that at least 0.4 fraction of Bobs have zero individual secrecy rate, which emphasizes
the vulnerability of a massive MIMO system against a PC attack.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We considered a single-cell massive MIMO system with several mobile users, and demon-
strated vulnerabilities of uplink pilot transmissions against jamming attacks. Specifically, the at-
tacker generates pilot sequences similar to those of users and contaminates the pilot transmissions
to distort channel estimation at the BS. This PC attack reduces the downlink transmission rates,
as the beamforming techniques utilized by the BS heavily depend on accurate CSI estimates.
We formulated an optimization problem from the standpoint of the attacker to minimize the
downlink sum-rate. Both cases when the attacker knows or does not know the distances between
the BS and users were considered. Using (stochastic) optimization and game theory, we derived
the optimal attacking strategies when the BS employs either fixed or optimal power allocation
for downlink transmissions. We also analyzed the secrecy rates of the users in massive MIMO
systems. In particular, we showed that even though such systems are robust against a passive
eavesdropper, the PC attack significantly reduces the maximum of the individual secrecy rates.
Numerical results showed that the downlink sum-rate is reduced by more than 50% if the average
distance between the attacker and the BS is less than the one of the users. We also observed
that even if the attacker does not know the channels and the locations of the users, it can launch
powerful attacks as if it has the perfect information. In this work, we assumed that the BS and
users are not aware of the attacker. An interesting future work is to develop counter algorithms
to prevent PC attacks.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF EQUATION (8)
lim
M→∞
P
(d)
l |hkvTl |2
M
= lim
M→∞
P
(d)
l |
hkhˆ
∗
l
M
|2
‖hˆl‖2
M
(39)
Let us evaluate the limit of the numerator and denominator separately. The limit of the denom-
inator is given by:
lim
M→∞
‖hˆl‖2
M
= θl +
1
PlL
(40)
The equality is due to the fact that given a vector x ∈ C1×M with a distribution CN (0, cI),
limM→∞ xx∗/M = c [11, Lemma 1]. We analyze the limit of the numerator as follows:
lim
M→∞
hkhˆ
∗
l
M
= lim
M→∞
√
θkgk(
√
θlgl + w˜l)
∗
M
= 0 (41)
gk, gl, and w˜l are independent vectors, and the result follows from [11, Lemma 1]. The expression
in the numerator of (39) is a continuous function of hkhˆ
∗
l /M . Therefore, using the Continuous
Mapping Theorem, we have the following result:
lim
M→∞
P
(d)
l |
hkhˆ
∗
l
M
|2 = 0 (42)
It proves the equation (8).
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(43)
In this proof, we follow the same steps as in Appendix A. Therefore, limM→∞ ‖hˆk‖2/M =
θk+1/(PkL). We exploit the Continuous Mapping Theorem to evaluate the limit of the numerator
as follows:
lim
M→∞
hkhˆ
∗
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M
= lim
M→∞
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√
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∗
M
(44)
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M→∞
θkgkg
∗
k
M
= θk (45)
Hence,
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(46)
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PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Let us define
Ak =
P
(d)
k MAz
γ
J
ukz
2γ
k
and Bk =
zγJ
ukz
γ
k
+
zγJ
ukAPkL
∀k ∈ K. Therefore, the objective of P1 can be written by
Rsum =
K∑
k=1
log
(
1 +
Ak
αk +Bk
)
(47)
Hence, the Lagrangian function of this problem is given by
L(α) =
K∑
k=1
log(1 +
Ak
αk +Bk
) + λ(
K∑
k=1
αk − 1). (48)
Its first derivative with respect to αk becomes
∂L(α)
∂αk
=
−Ak
(αk +Bk)(αk + Ak +Bk)
+ λ. (49)
Let α∗k ∀k ∈ K be the optimal value that minimizes the objective function of P1. These values
are also the roots of the polynomial functions where the equation (49) is equal to zero. Also,
note that α∗k ∀k ∈ K is a nonnegative number, and their summation is equal to 1 due to the
complementary slackness. Therefore,
α∗k =
[√
Ak(Ak + 4/λ)− Ak − 2Bk
2
]+
(50)
where λ is chosen such that
∑K
k=1 α
∗
k = 1.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The players of the game described in P3 are Alice and the attacker. In this game, the utility
function of Alice is Rsum(P
(d),α), and her strategy is to choose the optimal power allocation for
the downlink transmissions. Similarly, −Rsum(P(d),α) is the attacker’s utility, and her strategy
is to find the optimal α to maximize this utility. The strategy sets of both players are non-
empty, compact, and convex subsets of real numbers (the constraints in P3 are linear functions).
Furthermore, their utility functions are continuous and diagonally strictly concave. As a result,
the existence and uniqueness of NE is proved for this game, and Gauss-Seidel method converges
to this point [20].
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF EQUATION (23)
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Similar to the analysis in Appendices A and B, the limit of the denominator is θk+αkukθJ+
1
PkL
.
We again use the Continuous Mapping Theorem to find the limit of the numerator. In particular,
lim
M→∞
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∗
k
M
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√
αkukθJgJg
∗
J
M
(52)
=
√
αkukθk (53)
It proves the equation (23).
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